Consumers are, in general, less informed than producers about the quality of agricultural goods. To reduce the information gap, consumers can rely on certification that ensures the quality and origin of the goods. Certification can be voluntarily adopted by a group of producers, as is the case for geographical indications. We model such a group as a club, and analyze the certification decision of the club and its welfare implication. We find that for intermediate values of certification costs, the industry and a club of a given size have divergent incentives, and there may be overprovision of certification. If club members can erect barriers to entry, an optimal size of the club exists. There may be a conflict between the efficient outcome (that maximizes the aggregate profit of the firms) and the equilibrium, which may be socially undesirable. In the absence of a barrier to entry, it is less likely that a club will emerge.
Introduction
Consumers are, in general, less informed than producers about the quality of agricultural goods and they might never even be able to assess their quality. 1 To reduce the information gap, consumers can rely on standards (e.g., labels, geographical indications, certi…cations) that are granted or regulated by a governmental agency to ensure the quality of goods. However, these standards generally do not fully reveal information: if high-quality goods are certi…ed, it does not necessarily mean that all non-certi…ed goods are of low quality. For example, a geographical indication (GI) provides consumers with the information that the good has been produced within a certain geographical area and guarantees a certain quality. Yet producers who do not have the GI may produce a good of equal quality.
Our analysis focuses on GIs, and on the formation of a group of producers that obtains a GI. These standards are mostly used in Europe, as many countries (including the U.S.) are reluctant to adopt such protection (Addor and Grazioli, 2002) , 2 and they are generally combined with national labels (e.g., "label rouge" in France) to insure the quality and origin of goods. According to the World Trade Organization (WTO) de…nition, 3 GIs de…ne who can make a particular product, where the product is to be made, and what ingredients and techniques are to be used to guarantee origin and authenticity. The geographical link must occur in at least one of the stages of production, processing, or preparation. Examples of well-known GIs are Parmesan cheese, Champagne wine, or Roquefort cheese.
To obtain a GI, a group of producers must …r s t de…ne the product according to precise speci…cations; then the GI must be approved by a governmental agency. GIs are not limited to any particular …r m : there is no monopoly right in the hands of a single …r m , but rather it is a collective right. 4 In general, all producers in a speci…c geographical area have the right to use the GI if 1 These goods are called credence goods. For some other goods the quality cannot be assessed before they are purchased (experience goods). Nelson (1970) and Darbi and Karni (1973) introduced this categorization of goods.
2 European countries seek to extend GIs to most countries worldwide, as de…ned in the TRIP agreements. However, the U.S., Canada, and Australia, among other countries, are reluctant to adopt such protection.their products meet the stipulated requirements. Speci…cally, the protection should be given to any producer who can show the link between his product and the geographical origin. However, in practice, the group of producers that has de…ned the GI can make it harder for other producers to comply with the requirements. It is not uncommon to …n d that few producers are able to use a GI (e.g., Roquefort). The group can always claim that the quality of a potential entrant's product is not good enough or does not meet some of the speci…cations. For instance, it could be argued that to use the GI, an entrant must buy land in the area to be able to claim the geographical link. In economic terms, the group creates a direct barrier to entry with the imposition of an entry cost.
Our contribution is to o¤er a formal framework to understand and explain the formation of these groups. We investigate whether the equilibrium is an e¢ cient outcome that maximizes the aggregate pro…t of the …r m s , and whether it is socially e¢ cient. The objective of our analysis is to address some of the topical issues raised by the opposition to the adoption of GIs by some countries. In fact, it might be that the adoption of a GI is socially undesirable because it is too costly (the bene…t from adopting does not o¤set the cost), and too few producers bene…t from it. For instance, the U.S. favors trademarks, and argues that GIs are su¢ ciently protected under existing trademark laws and would be too expensive to implement.
5 Another possible explanation is that some producers may lobby the government when the adoption of a GI is not an e¢ cient outcome. According to Hayes, Lence and Babcock (2005) , a few large U.S. food companies oppose GIs, which may be why the U.S. is reluctant to adopt them. However, it is di¢ cult to actually identify such behavior, as …r m s do not necessarily advertise it. Yet it seems reasonable to believe that if too few producers bene…t from the certi…cation, the entire industry might oppose its adoption.
We consider a model of vertical di¤erentiation in which …r m s produce goods of given quality. 6 Consumers are not aware of the quality of the good unless they get more information through certi…cation. At the outset, some producers of high quality goods can decide to form a group to obtain a GI, and share the associated cost. We explicitly model GIs as club goods (non-rival, 5 However, there are major di¤erences between trademarks and GIs. Trademarks are not limited by any territorial link, can be easily transferred or licensed, and are private in nature. Similar comments apply for certi…cation marks or collective marks (e.g., Vidalia onions, Idaho potatoes).
6 Models of vertical di¤erentiation were …r s t developed in the context of a monopoly (Mussa and Rosen, 1978) and a duopoly (Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979; Sutton, 1982, 1983) . The focus was on the optimal choice of product qualities. congestible and excludable), 7 where letting one more producer join the club reduces the average certi…cation cost, but also reduces the pro…t for each producer. Producers who seek to join the club must comply with speci…c quality requirements.
We investigate under what circumstances producers may prefer to rely on GIs -a certi…cation regime that does not fully reveal information, whether this is an e¢ cient outcome and if it can be welfare-improving. We then determine the optimal club size and the equilibrium, …r s t in the presence of a direct barrier to entry and, then, in the absence of a barrier.
Our …n d i n g s are the following. For intermediate values of GI cost and for a given club size, the group of labelled producers and the entire industry have divergent labeling incentives, and for some constellation of parameters (in particular, if the fraction of high-quality producers is relatively high) there may be overprovision of labels compared to what is socially desirable. In this case, the bene…t from the revelation of the quality does not outweigh the cost and the loss incurred by low-quality producers. This can explain the reluctance of some countries to adopt GIs. It is either too costly to implement or, if not, it might be the case that the entire industry lobbies the government to prevent the imposition of GIs.
We then wonder what should be the optimal size of the club. If the government prevents the imposition of a barrier to entry, most likely no club will be formed and, therefore, no revelation of information will occur. As it is socially desirable to have some revelation of information, the government may allow a club of producers to prevent entry. Hence, an optimal club size exists and more revelation of information occurs. However, depending on the cost structure, there is still a divergence between the incentives of the club and those of the entire industry (the equilibrium outcome and the e¢ cient outcome are divergent), and there may be overprovision of the label. That again might explain why some countries are reluctant to use GIs, as it might be too costly to implement them.
Asymmetric information between sellers and consumers has been widely studied in the economic literature. Starting with the seminal work of Akerlof (1970) , studies have shown how asymmetric information a¤ects the allocation and distribution of resources. When it is more costly to produce high quality than low quality goods, prices can signal the quality (Bagwell and Riordan, 1991) . However, it is not always possible to signal quality through prices, especially when marginal costs of production are identical, as we assume here.
Allowing uninformed consumers to become better informed can also be done through a certi…cation intermediary, which is what we consider in this paper. Biglaiser (1993) and Biglaiser and Friedman (1994) investigate how middlemen can partially mitigate the problem of asymmetric information. What amount of information should be revealed by the certi…cation intermediaries and how this a¤ects surplus has been studied by Lizzeri (1999) . In our paper, qualities are given and we do not allow for strategic revelation of information by the certi…cation intermediary. We assume that the information conveyed by the intermediary is accurate and that it completely reveals the quality. Unlike Lizzeri (1999) , wherein consumers have identical tastes, we consider that they di¤er in their tastes for quality (or willingness to pay for quality) and, therefore, those who value the good the most consume the high-quality good. We do not question whether self-certi…cation or public intervention is better. 8 Furthermore, labels can be private or public.
9 Public labeling can be done directly by a public agency that controls the entire labeling process, or through a third-party or middleman (producer association) that certi…es the goods according to rules imposed by a regulator. Our paper is concerned with the latter case: a certi…cation intermediary that has the power to certify, 10 and we consider that the cost of labeling is shared by all of the producers who acquire the label.
To the best of our knowledge, there are only a few formal contributions that study GIs. In a recent paper, Moschini et al. (2008) consider that the use of a GI cannot be denied to any producer in a geographical area, and they propose a model of perfect competition in which there is free entry/exit in the production of high-quality goods. In our model, we have a very di¤erent approach, as a GI can be used as a tool to prevent entry. The rationale for this is the observation of high prices for GI goods, and the fact that the high quality alone does not justify such a high price. Therefore, this suggests the existence of some market power that cannot be captured in a perfectly competitive setting.
Our paper is close to that of Marette and Crespi (2003) , where they investigate whether cartels (producer associations that use common labels and 8 A public agency may bene…t from economies of scale when the …x e d costs for certi…-cation are high (Auriol and Schillizzi, 2003) .
9 See Bergès-Sennou, Bontems and Réquillart (2004) for a survey on private labels, Crespi and Marette (2003) for a survey on public labels, and Marette (2005) for a survey on common labeling. 10 As to who should pay for labeling, Crespi and Marette (2001) show that in most cases, a per-unit or an ad valorem fee is preferred. trademarks) improve overall welfare. They consider that producers can collude in quantity, and use the concept of sequential formation of a cartel to examine the actions of sellers who join a cartel. They show that if cartels are allowed and there exists a third-party certi…cation, a stable cartel may emerge. Our analysis, however, is di¤erent from theirs on several grounds. We do not allow for collusion on quantity; rather, we consider that an association of producers can be formed to get a common label, but they compete in quantity afterwards. The group can reduce competition by not allowing too many producers into the group. Our formation of the group is a club formation. The optimal club size is the result of a trade-o¤ between allowing more producers to join the club, which reduces the average cost, and reducing the number of club members, which increases the pro…t of each producer.
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The paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in section 2. Section 3 gives the details of the production stage under di¤erent scenarios. In section 4 we study the provision of certi…cation for a given club size. Section 5 is concerned with the determination of the optimal size of the club and the existence of an equilibrium. In section 6 we derive the optimal certi…cation choice by producers. Section 7 concludes.
The model
We consider a model in which m > 2 …r m s produce goods of either high or low quality, where s h > s l . We assume that a fraction (respectively, 1 ) of the …r m s produce high-quality goods (respectively, low-quality), and that the marginal cost of production is identical for all of the …r m s and normalized to zero. Both the assumption of zero marginal cost, which allows to have a tractable model, and the assumption that the number of …r m s is exogenous are simplifying assumptions that do not distract from our main objective. Indeed, we are mainly interested in understanding the mechanism by which …r m s decide to obtain a certi…cation when they already produce high-quality goods.
Information is asymmetric, as consumers do not know the quality of the good, while producers know the quality of their own good. However, the information gap can be reduced if some (or all) of the high-quality producers obtain certi…cation, in which case consumers learn that the certi…ed goods are of high quality.
To be more speci…c on the demand side, we consider N consumers, each of whom consumes either one or zero units of the good, and we normalize 11 On club goods see, for instance, Scotchmer (2002) . N = 1. Each consumer has the following preferences: U = s p if he buys the good of quality s and pays p, 0 otherwise, where 2 R + is a taste parameter and s 2 R + represents the quality of the good. For a given price, all consumers prefer high quality, but a consumer with a high is more willing to pay to have a high-quality good. We assume that is distributed according to a uniform distribution between 0 and 1 and, thus, F ( ) is the fraction of consumers with a taste parameter of less than .
In the case of a unique quality, there exists a consumer b who is indi¤erent between buying the good or not. His utility is b s p = 0 and, hence, b = p=s. Consumers with high willingness to pay > b buy the good, and the demand function is D(p) = (1 p=s). The inverse demand is, thus,
where Q represents the total quantity. With two di¤erent levels of quality and s h =p h < s l =p l (the quality-adjusted price is higher for low quality), a consumer e is indi¤erent between consuming a good of high or low quality and, thus, e s h p h = e s l p l ; where p h (respectively, p l ) is the price for the high-(respectively, low-) quality good. Hence, e = (p h p l )=(s h s l ). Consumers who choose not to buy the high-quality good, buy either the low quality or nothing. There exists an indi¤erent consumer such that b s l p l = 0: The demands for high quality and low quality are, thus,
We can easily derive the inverse demand functions
where Q h (respectively, Q l ) represents the total quantity of high-(respectively, low-) quality goods. At the outset of the game, a trustable governmental agency allows highquality producers to adopt a label that perfectly reveals quality.
12 If none of the producers get the label, there is no revelation of information. On the other hand, if all of them get the label, there is full revelation of information and consumers learn perfectly the quality. 13 If only a fraction of high-quality producers adopts the label, consumers are only partially informed about the quality. When buying a labeled good, they know that it is of high quality, whereas they do not know the quality of a non-labeled good. Among the non-labeled goods, some are of low quality and some are of high quality. We denote label-G as a label with only partial revelation of information, as can be the case with GIs. Further, the number of high-quality producers that get the label is endogenously de…ned.
The endogenous club formation has two stages. In the …r s t stage, …r m s form a club of optimal size n . In the second stage, producers and consumers learn the existence of the club. Contingent on the club size, …r m s compete as oligopolists in the product market.
We consider the following scenarios: (i) no certi…cation; (ii) certi…cation fully reveals the quality of the good; (iii) certi…cation reveals only high-quality goods when the size of the club is positive but smaller than m. Scenarios (i) and (ii) are benchmark cases against which we compare scenario (iii).
Production stage
In this section, we …r s t de…ne the Cournot equilibrium for each possible scenario, and then we compare the results under the di¤erent regimes for a given club size.
Benchmark case: no certi…cation regime
As a benchmark, we consider a regime with no certi…cation. Consumer expectation of the quality is
Consumer e a is indi¤erent between buying the good of expected quality s a and not buying it, e a s a p = 0. Hence, the inverse demand function for the 13 For instance, consider a monopolist that can produce either a high-quality good or a low-quality good. The quality is unknown by consumers, and we assume that with a probability 1=2 the good is of high quality. Thus, if it is not too costly to certify the good, there exits a separating equilibrium in which the high-quality producer will certify his good, whereas the low-quality producer never certi…es his good. Thus, consumers learn the quality of the good, as certi…ed goods are of high quality, whereas non-certi…ed goods are of low quality.
where Q is the total quantity. Each …r m chooses the quantity that maximizes its payo¤,
where q i + q i = Q. Firms are symmetric and, thus, q i = (m 1)q. The maximization program of each …r m becomes
which gives the best response function of each …r m ,
Because of symmetry, q i = q, and thus, the optimal output level for each …r m is q = 1=(1 + m) and the price is p = s a =(1 + m). Each …r m gets a gross pro…t
To complete the analysis, we de…ne the consumer surplus
and, therefore, the total welfare is
Ful l revelation certi…cation regime
The other polar case is when all of the high-quality producers obtain certi…-cation that fully informs consumers. This can happen if, for instance, there is a mandatory label and all of the high-quality producers must get the label. Consumers then know that certi…ed goods are of high quality, whereas 14 In this simple setting, because marginal costs are identical, if …r m s have to choose their quality, they will all produce a low-quality good. Consumers anticipate this correctly and, thus, they are only willing to pay s l =(1 + m). This leads to a market failure. But here, qualities are given.
non-certi…ed goods are of low quality. Thus, depending on their willingness to pay, they buy the high-quality good or the low-quality good. Demands are de…ned by equations (2) and (3).
We assume that there is a …x e d certi…cation cost C that is borne by the entire group of certi…ed producers. For instance, this may be the administrative cost associated with the label. In our analysis we abstract from other kinds of costs, such as implementation costs to guarantee that each producer complies with the rules (costs that actually should be borne by the regulatory agency) or the cost of insuring a certain quality (for instance, cost per unit of production). In a more general setting, the labeling cost could also depend on the total number of high quality producers and/or on the quantity produced by high-quality …r m s . However, to keep our model simple, we only consider the …x e d part of the cost, as we believe that it is the most signi…cant.
We relegate to the appendix the maximization programs and their resolutions. The quantities o¤ered, respectively, by each high-quality and lowquality producer are
The prices are p h = s h q h and p l = s l q l ; and the gross pro…ts are
Each high-quality producer gets the net pro…t
Consumer surplus S is de…ned in the appendix, and the total welfare is
Some revelation: label-G regime
Consider now that n > 0 high-quality producers decide to form a group and obtain a label-G at a cost C g . Because the label is granted by a trustable agency, consumers have no doubt about the veracity of the information provided. However, as is the case with GIs, the group of producers has to precisely de…ne a set of speci…c rules that include geographical area (e.g., to make a labeled cheese, the rules must specify the location where the milk originates). Therefore, the cost associated with the label-G, C g , can be different from C: Besides the administrative cost of the label, it can also include the coordination cost associated with having all producers agree on a speci…c set of rules and, therefore, C g > C. However, it can also be the converse, C g < C, as the mandatory labelling can be more costly to implement.
Only high-quality producers can be part of the group (n m) and consumers who buy the label-G good know that it is of high quality. There is no collusion, no cartel formation; just a club that is formed by a group of producers to obtain the bene…t of revealing the quality of their good. For now, we consider that with a given club size, entry is prevented, as no more high-quality producers can get into the club. In the next section, we discuss whether such an equilibrium exists and, if so, under what conditions. The remaining (m n) producers do not belong to the group and whenever consumers buy from them, they do not know the quality. Among these producers, (1 )m produce low quality, whereas ( m n) produce high quality. Hence, some consumers choose to buy the certi…ed (known high-quality) good, and others choose not to and buy a good of expected quality
There exists an indi¤erent consumer e g such that e g s h p g = e g s a g
p; where p g is the price of the label-G good and p is the price of the non-label-G good. Demands and maximization programs are also de…ned in the appendix. The quantities o¤ered, respectively, by each label-G and non-label-G producer are
These optimal quantities are decreasing in n. The optimal prices are p g = s h q g and p a = s a g q a : A label-G producer produces more than a non-label-G producer (i.e., q g > q a ) and, therefore, the price charged by the label-G producers is higher than the non-label-G price (i.e., p g > p a ). Because there is complete resolution of uncertainty concerning the quality in the case of label-G, demand is higher and, thus, producers produce more.
The gross payo¤s of each label-G and non-label-G producer are
The net payo¤ of each label-G producer is
and each non-label-G high-quality producer gets a 0: Consumer surplus S g (n) is de…ned in the appendix and is increasing with n. For a given n the social welfare is
The label-G regime is an intermediate case between the two extreme regimes: the non-certi…cation regime (n = 0) and the full-revelation regime (n = m).
We summarize the optimal quantities, prices, pro…ts, and consumer surplus (CS) for the three di¤erent regimes in table 1. 
Provision of certi…cation for a given club size
To have a better understanding of how a club of a given size can impact on the labeling decision, we …r s t assume that the club size is exogenously given, and then compare the di¤erent regimes. Not everyone will bene…t from the revelation of information. Those who bene…t are the certi…ed high-quality producers, some of the consumers with a low willingness to pay (who cannot a¤ord to buy a good of unknown quality, but are willing to buy a less expensive non-labeled good), and consumers with a high willingness to pay, who are willing to pay a higher price for high quality. On the other hand, those who lose from revelation of information are the high-quality producers who do not get the label, low-quality producers, and consumers with medium willingness to pay who have a lower probability of buying a high-quality good when there is some revelation of information. Therefore, who decides to get the label and who opposes it will a¤ect the labeling decision.
We …r s t provide a comparison of the optimal quantities, prices, pro…ts and consumer surplus in table 2.
Comparisons Quantities In terms of output, in a full-revelation regime, a certi…ed high-(noncerti…ed low-) quality producer produces more (less) than any producer in a non-certi…cation regime. In the non-certi…cation regime, the production is based on the average quality, which is the only quality consumers are aware of. Whereas in a certi…cation regime, production is based on the true value of the quality. A label-G (non-label-G) producer produces more (less) than a producer in a non-certi…cation regime and a label-G (non-label-G) producer produces more (more) than a high-(low-) quality producer in the full-revelation regime.
The price charged by high-(low-) quality producers is higher (lower) than the price charged under the non-certi…cation regime because high-quality producers can charge a higher price for their high-quality goods. The price charged for the label-G (non-label-G) product is higher (lower) than the price charged in a non-certi…cation regime, and the price charged for the label-G (non-label-G) product is higher (higher) than the price charged for the high-(low-) quality product in a full-revelation regime.
In terms of gross pro…ts, a label-G (non-label-G) producer gets a higher (lower) pro…t than a producer in a non-certi…cation regime, and a label-G (non-label-G) producer obtains a higher (higher) pro…t than a high-(low-) quality producer in a non-certi…cation regime.
Finally, because consumer surplus is increasing with n and n = 0 (n = m) corresponds to the non-certi…cation (full-revelation) regime, consumers are worse (better) o¤ in the case of label-G compared to the full-revelation (non-certi…cation) regime (i.e., S a < S g < S).
We now analyze the conditions under which the label-G regime is preferred to any other regimes for di¤erent groups of producers (labeled high-quality producers, all high-quality producers, entire group of producers) and for the society as a whole.
A club of high-quality producers of given size n gets the label as long as the label-G cost is not too high, i.e., C g < g ( g is de…ned in the appendix). On the other hand, if the labeling decision is made by the entire industry it will occur less often, as a label would be adopted only if C g < 2 < g .
We can therefore posit the …r s t proposition.
Proposition 1: For intermediate values of both certi…cation costs C g and C, label-G producers are better o¤ under the label-G regime, whereas the industry as a whole is worse o¤ .
All of the proofs are given in the appendix.
The certi…cation incentives for a club of a given size and the industry as a whole are divergent. If the loss incurred by all of the producers who cannot get the label exceeds the bene…t to the certi…ed producers, the entire industry is worse o¤. Therefore, if the entire industry can lobby the government and prevent the adoption of a label, it will not be adopted. This might be one part of the explanation of the refusal to adopt GIs in the U.S.: some companies might be trying to convince the government to reject GIs altogether (Hayes, Lence and Babcock, 2005) .
To determine whether the adoption of a label is socially e¢ cient, we need to consider the consumer surplus and compare total welfare under all scenarios.
First, if the cost of full certi…cation is higher than the label-G certi…cation cost (C > C g ), for intermediate values of C g and for a relatively high fraction of high-quality producers ( > ), there is overprovision of label-G. To see this, we compare the losses of the producers who did not get the label and the bene…t to consumers from being more informed. If the full certi…cation cost is too high, it is socially too costly to adopt full certi…cation, and the choice is between label-G and no certi…cation. If the fraction of high-quality producers is relatively high, the loss incurred by non-labeled producers is borne by more high-quality producers. Therefore, for some values of the label-G cost, the bene…t in the consumer surplus does not outweigh the losses of the non-labeled producers. From a society viewpoint, it is, thus, too costly to inform consumers of the quality of the good.
For intermediate values of both certi…cation costs that are relatively close, there may still be overprovision of the label for a relatively high fraction of high-quality producers when the club size is not too small (n > n 1 ).
If the cost of full certi…cation is lower than the label-G certi…cation cost, C < C g , not surprisingly, full revelation of information may be preferred by all producers, as well as by society. If not, there may be underprovision of the label: society would prefer more revelation of information, but if it is the club's decision, not all of the high-quality producers will get the label (See …g u r e 1).
We summarize these …n d i n g s in the following proposition.
Proposition 2: For a relatively high fraction of high-quality producers , there is over-provision of label-G, if C > C g , and for intermediate values of the label-G cost, C g 2 ( 3 ; g ), for intermediate values of the cost C close enough to C g , and for a club size that is not too small ( n > n 1 ).
Further, whenever there is overprovision of the label, the incentives of the industry and of the club are divergent. For all of the other con…gurations of parameters (i.e., for any size smaller than n 1 , or for any ) and costs, society may prefer more revelation of information, whereas no high-quality producers may want a label, or the incentives may coincide.
We summarize these results in table 3. See also …g u r e 1 in the appendix to have a comprehensive and synthetic view of the results.
Group
Label-G is preferred
Label-G producers
Highquality producers 
Optimal club size and provision of certi…-cation
In the previous sections, we considered that the club size was exogenously given. We now turn to the determination of the optimal club size. The rationale for a club is that GIs can be seen as club goods that are non-rival but congestible (many …r m s can have access to this kind of protection, but if too many of them have access to it, it will decrease the pro…t of each) and excludable (those who do not have the label are excluded from its bene…ts). Hence, each producer derives bene…t from joining the club, but the arrival of new members will reduce the bene…t. A club is formed if and only if all the potential members agree to its formation.
We …r s t de…ne the optimal size of the club. The net bene…t to each member of the club is de…ned by equation (9). The optimal size is the solution to the following maximization program:
Cg n g;
with n m:
Because g (n) is decreasing and convex in n, we may have several solutions. If we assume a positive interior solution, 15 n must satisfy
which we re-write as
With n producers in the club, if a new member enters, the total costs imposed on the existing members is represented by the term on the left-hand side of equation (10). On the right-hand side, the bene…t from a new member is the amount received in additional membership fees. At the optimum, the total cost imposed on existing members must be equal to the bene…t from a new member. Let n be the optimal size of the label-G group. Which …r m s join the club cannot be determined without more speci…cation about …r m s . In our setting, because …r m s are identical, it does not matter which ones will be part of the club. In a di¤erent setting where …r m s are heterogeneous, for instance, with respect to their "eagerness" to join the club, the most eager producers join the club, and the rest of the high-quality producers have no opportunity to signal their quality. In the case of GIs, the group of high-quality producers that precisely de…nes the quality and location requirements needed to obtain a GI, will be the club. Therefore, it is likely that producers within the club are those who originated the GI.
Using equation (8), the …r s t -o r d e r condition becomes
Consider now that the entire industry can decide the club size. The e¢ -cient outcome is such that it maximizes aggregate pro…ts of the …r m s in the entire industry. Therefore, the optimization problem becomes ( Max
The optimal size n is the solution of
By comparing the …r s t -o r d e r conditions, we obtain n > n . The club size is suboptimal, as from the industry viewpoint, too few high-quality producers are part of the club. The optimal size of the club is not the e¢ cient outcome.
Lemma 1: If a club can be formed, its size is suboptimal from the industry viewpoint.
If the label-G cost is small enough compared to the full-certi…cation cost, at the optimal level of the industry, n , the label-G regime gives a higher welfare than the full-certi…cation regime. However, at the club level, n , welfare is lower under the label-G regime. So far, we have only de…ned the optimal size of the club that some producers of high-quality will join. But is this a Nash equilibrium? A club of size n is an equilibrium if and only if there is neither a member who wishes to deviate and leave the club, nor a …r m outside of the club that wants to get in.
We need to make sure that no deviation occurs, and therefore, that each high-quality producer inside and outside of the club has no incentive to deviate. To see this, even though all of our discussion is in terms of continuous values for the club's size, we provide our rationale in discrete terms. A highquality producer in the club does not deviate if
and a high-quality producer outside of the club chooses not to get into the club if a (n ) g (n + 1)
These two inequalities cannot hold simultaneously, and thus n cannot be an equilibrium. Indeed, a high-quality producer inside the club has no incentive to deviate as long as C g is small enough, whereas a producer outside of the club has an incentive to get into the club.
However, an equilibrium (n 1) exists such that none of the producers deviate:
At n; a producer outside of the club prefers not to join, whereas a producer inside prefers to leave the club. At n 1, a producer outside of the club gets less from joining the club and a producer inside the club has no incentive to exit. This is an equilibrium. Furthermore, this equilibrium exists only if C g > m( h l ) = 1 (see appendix). However, if C g < 1 , the equilibrium is the entire group of high-quality producers, m.
Proposition 3: Under a free-entry condition, there is no equilibrium with a club of optimal size. However, under certain cost conditions, a club of larger size may exist.
If the government lets the club set a barrier to entry, the optimal club size can be reached. The barrier can be such that any producer who wants to join the club after the optimal size has been reached needs to pay an extra …x e d cost. This fee can be set at exactly g (n )
Cg n . For instance, because of the geographical restraint, if one more producer decides to be certi…ed, he must buy land within the geographical area. In fact, OECD (2000) points out that "the conditions of entry to producer groups with a geographical name are often set out in the group's own statutes; this leaves it free to set conditions that may not be consistent with the free play of competition."However, this behavior may be prohibited by law, and some anticompetitive cases have been observed.
We now consider the adoption decision under both the free entry condition and the no free entry condition.
No barrier to entry
First, consider that it is prohibited by law to prevent entry. Entry into the club is only restricted by the certi…cation costs. The only equilibrium in this case is (n 1) if C g > m( h l ). If C g < 1 , the equilibrium is the total number of high-quality producers, m.
If n exists, because a is strictly decreasing in n and the inequality > g (n)
Cg n is always satis…ed, the high-quality producers prefer not to choose a certi…cation, and thus, n = 0. On the other hand, if C g < 1 , the only optimal size is the entire group of high-quality producers, m. Then, for values of C g 2 [ 1 ; m( h l )], high-quality producers choose not to label.
Proposition 4: A club with free entry with a size strictly higher than 0 and strictly smaller than m is not viable.
This is actually consistent with the literature on club goods, where there is a problem of stability of the equilibrium (see Scotchmer, 2002) . For any certi…cation cost C g C, all of the high-quality producers join the club. For C g > 1 , no high-quality producers join the club. We can thus posit the following proposition:
Proposition 5: If the club cannot create a barrier to entry, for low enough certi…cation costs, all of the high-quality producers join the club; for high certi…cation costs, there is no club and there may be underprovision of the label.
Barrier to entry
Let us now consider that a barrier to entry can be created. We assume that ex ante the optimal club size is de…ned, and that any extra producer who wants to get into the club has to pay an extra fee, corresponding to the pro…t earned by each member of the club (or possibly less). We can now de…ne the optimal choice of certi…cation. As before, we need to determine the areas where label-G producers are better o¤ if they get a label. However, here we need to account for the fact that the optimal club size is endogenous and, thus, n depends on C g . Label-G producers are better o¤ under the label-G regime if C g < g (C g ), where g is now a function of C g (see appendix). We show that there exists a value of C g such that C g = g (C g ). Let C g (C) denote this value. It …r s t increases with C and then is a constant. Therefore, for any certi…cation cost C g C g (C), n high-quality producers join the club. However, for C g > C g (C), no highquality producers join the club. We can thus posit the following proposition:
Proposition 6: If the club can create a barrier to entry, for intermediate values of certi…cation costs, a positive optimal club size exists, i.e., n 2 (0; m), -and for a relatively high fraction of high-quality producers there is overprovision of the label; -otherwise there is underprovision, for higher certi…cation costs, there is no club.
Allowing producers to restrict entry permits some revelation of information. However, it is not always socially optimal, as it may lead to excessive labeling. Furthermore, 1 < C g ; where C g corresponds to the constant value of C g (C). For values of C g 2 ( 1 ; C g ), by letting the club create a barrier to entry, the government allows for more revelation of information. Indeed, in the absence of a barrier to entry, for these values of the certi…cation costs, no club will be formed. However, if entry is prevented, there will be some revelation of information and a club with less than all of the high-quality producers will be formed.
From an antitrust perspective, the creation of a barrier to entry can be challenged in court because it is an anti-competitive behavior. However, in general, those practices that have been observed by authorities on competition were also linked to other practices aimed at restricting production (e.g., in 1998, French competitive authorities denounced abusive practices in the sector of comté cheese, 98-D-54).
Conclusion
Advances in information technologies and logistics continue to lower the costs of providing new food products to consumers. These advances have increased the incentive for some producers to implement new certi…cation programs to help them di¤erentiate their products. We analyze the welfare consequences of certi…cation programs on producers, consumers and society. Certi…cation costs play a key role in determining the distributional bene…ts. Relative to the baseline case of no certi…cation, a certi…cation program that fully reveals quality bene…ts high-quality producers and is detrimental to low-quality producers. The level of certi…cation costs determines whether the gains to high-quality producers o¤set the losses to low-quality producers. Both consumers with high and low willingness to pay gain from certi…cation. Indeed, those with high willingness to pay bene…t by being able to buy a high-quality product with certainty. Those with low willingness to pay bene…t from lower prices for low-quality production. However, consumers with moderate willingness to pay may lose from certi…cation, because they now have to pay a high price for a high-quality product, whereas without certi…cation they had a chance at obtaining a high-quality product at a lower price. More interestingly, we model a certi…cation program that does not fully reveal quality such as geographical indications: some non-labeled producers may sell high-quality goods, but consumers are not aware of it. We de…ne the group of producers who are selling the labeled good as a club, and we study the club formation and its welfare consequences. Certi…cation costs also play a key role in determining the distributional bene…ts. If the government prevents producers from creating a barrier to entry, no club will be formed and, therefore, no revelation of information will occur. This might not be socially desirable, as consumers would bene…t from some revelation of information about the quality of the goods. Hence, the government might decide to allow the club to prevent entry (e.g., newcomers have to pay an entry fee). This will lead to the formation of a club of producers who reveal the quality of their goods. However, this might not be desirable from a society viewpoint either. In other words, the implementation of a GI might be too costly and too few producers may bene…t from it. It may be one part of the explanation of why some countries are reluctant to adopt GIs. For instance, the U.S. is among those who claim that a GI regime would be too costly to implement and that the current trademark regime is providing adequate protection.
Appendix

Production stage Ful l -revel at i on certi…cation regime
Each high-quality …r m i chooses q ih that solves
where q h (q l ) is the quantity sold by each other high-quality (low-quality) producer.
Each low-quality …r m j chooses q jl that solves
The best-response function of each high-quality …r m is
and of each low-quality …r m is
Because high-(low-) quality …r m s are identical, q ih = q h and q jl = q l , and the best response functions of each high-(low-) quality …r m , q h (q l ) to the quantity o¤ered by each low-(high-) quality …r m q l (q h ) are
Thus, solving for these two equations, we …n d (4) and (5). Consumer surplus is given by
where 
Label-G regime
The inverse demand functions for the label-G good and the non-label-G good are
where Q g represents the total quantity of label-G good produced, and Q a is the total quantity of goods of unknown value.
Let …r m i denote one of the label-G good producers, with i = 1; ::::; n, and …r m j being one of the non-label-G producers, with j = 1; ::::; m n. The maximization program of each …r m i is
and of each …r m j is
The best-response function of each …r m within the label-G group is
and outside of the group is q j (q g ; q a ) = 1 (m n 1)qa nqg 2
:
As …r m s are identical within the group or outside of the group, q i = q g and q j = q a . The best-response functions of each …r m inside (respectively, outside) the group, q g (respectively, q a ) to the quantity o¤ered by each …r m outside (respectively, inside) the group q a (respectively, q g ) are
Thus, solving for these two equations, we …n d (6) and (7). The total consumer surplus is
where
The derivative of the surplus is strictly positive. Furthermore, when n = 0, the consumer surplus is the surplus in case of no certi…cation (i.e., S g (0) = S a ), whereas when n = m, it is the case when the quality is perfectly known (i.e., S g ( m) = S).
Comparison of the di¤erent regimes
Non-certi…cation, full-revelation, and label-G regimes For a given club size, we study under what conditions a label-G regime will be adopted, and whether the industry and society are better o¤. Our discussion depends on both the label-G and the full-certi…cation costs, C g and C.
Label-G producers are better o¤ under the full-revelation regime versus the non-certi…cation regime if m h C > m , or equivalently C < 1 m( h ) (this is actually the same for all of the high-quality producers). Thus, as long as C > 1 , we need only to compare the label-G regime and the non-certi…cation regime. Label-G producers are better o¤ under the label-G regime as long as n g C g > n , which is equivalent to
). For C < 1 , they are better o¤ under label-G versus
Hence, overall, label-G makes them better o¤ as long as
Cg. At the level of the entire group of high-quality producers, the label-G regime is appealing less often, as not all of the high-quality producers get in the club, and therefore some of them cannot enjoy the bene…t of the label-G regime. If C > 1 ; high-quality producers are better o¤ under the noncerti…cation regime (compared to the full-revelation regime). Furthermore, they are better o¤ under the label-G regime if n g +( m n) a C g > m or C g < 1 where 1 g ( m n)( a ). However, if C < 1 , they are better o¤ under label-G (versus full certi…cation) if
Thus, high-quality producers prefer the label-G regime as long as C g < 1 = minf 1 ; ' 1 + Cg. As 1 < g and ' 1 < ' g , the set of parameters is smaller. Therefore, 1 < g .
The label-G regime can only be appealing if ' 1 > 0. If not, the label-G regime is never preferred by high-quality producers. Furthermore, ' 1 is an increasing and then decreasing function of n, with ' 1 (0) < 0 and ' 1 ( m) = 0. Thus, there exists a value n 1 < msuch that ' 1 (n 1 ) = 0. Thus ' 1 > 0 implies that n > n 1 .
At the level of the industry, all the producers prefer the full-certi…cation regime over the non-certi…cation regime as long as m h C +(1 )m l > m or C < 2 where 2 1 (1 )m( l ) < 1 . For C > 2 , the entire industry is better o¤ with label-G as long as n g + (m n) a C g > m or C g < 2 ; where 2 = 1 (1 )m( a ) < 1 . On the other hand, for C < 2 , the entire industry is better o¤ under label-G if
The function ' 2 is …r s t increasing and then decreasing with n; with ' 2 (0) < 0 and ' 2 ( m) = 0. There exists a value n 2 < msuch that ' 2 (n 2 ) = 0 with n 2 < n 1 . Thus, as long as C g < 2 = minf 2 ; ' 2 +Cg; the entire industry is better o¤. Further, 2 < g :
Because consumer surplus is increasing with n and n = 0 (respectively, n = m) corresponds to the non-certi…cation (respectively, full-revelation) regime, consumers are worse (respectively, better) o¤ in the case of label-G compared to the full-revelation (respectively, non-certi…cation) regime (i.e., S a < S g < S). The entire society is better o¤ under full revelation versus non-revelation for m h C + (1 )m l + S > m + S a or C < 3 ; where 3 = 2 + S S a > 2 . For values of C > 3 , society can bene…t from the label-G regime if
Further, we show that 3 > 3 ; which implies that ' 3 < 0. To prove that the 3 > 3 , we calculate
2 (2m + mn + 3) : The di¤erence 3 3 is positive if ( ) < 0, and therefore we need to study the function ( ). First, note that (0) < 0, (1) < 0, and 0 ( ) > 0 for 2 [0; 1]. Hence, the function ( ) < 0; which proves that 3 > 3 . Hence, as long as C < C g , the label-G is never preferred by the entire society.
We now show that
We can easily calculate that 2 (0) = 0 = 2 (1). We now need to study 2 for 2 [0; 1]. To do so, we study the function 2 ( ). Indeed, if we show that 2 ( ) > 0, then 2 > 0. First, for the extreme values of , 2 (0) > 0 and 2 (1) = 2s 0; 1) . Hence, the function 2 ( ) is strictly decreasing but positive for 2 (0; 1); and we can conclude that 2 > 0.
Using the same kind of reasoning, we can also prove that 3 > 1 . Indeed,
3 )) +s h (m + 1) (2s h + 3ms h + m 2 s h + 2m 2 s l ). We study the function 4 , and show that it is negative over 2 [0; 1].
We need to show that 1 < g or equivalently that n(
) is increasing and concave on the interval (0; m). It is strictly increasing and negative at 0, and it is decreasing and equal to m( h ) for n = m. Therefore, there exists a unique n < msuch that n( g (n) ) = m( h ), that we denote n 1 . Hence, for any n > n 1 ; 1 < g .
We also need to show that 3 < g ; which is equivalent to showing that
H is a quadratic function of ; H = A 2 + B + C where A > 0 and B C A > 0 for any n; as long as the size of the entire industry is not too small or the di¤erence between the qualities is large enough. Therefore, there exists a value 2 (0; 1) such that for > , H < 0.
To complete our analysis, we need to insure that certi…ed …r m s are making positive payo¤s in case of full certi…cation, i.e., C m h ; and in case of the label-G regime, i.e., C g n g (n). This is equivalent to showing that 3 m h and ' g n g (n). It is immediate to show that the latter inequality is satis…ed as ' g = n( g h ). Showing that the former inequality is satis…ed is equivalent to showing that S S a < m (1 )m l , which is, in fact, satis…ed for any > .
We represent the di¤erent choices in a graph (C; C g ). For large club size For values of C g smaller than i , i = g for label-G high-quality producers, i = 1 for all the high-quality producers, i = 2 for the industry, and i = 3 for society, the label-G regime is preferred. For values of C g larger than i and larger than i , no certi…cation is preferred, whereas full revelation is preferred for values of C g < i . Thus, we can isolate three areas of interest. Area 1 is where high-quality producers and the industry prefer no certi…cation at all, whereas label-G producers and society would be better o¤ under the label-G regime and full-revelation certi…cation, respectively. This arises for relatively high C g . In area 2, high-quality producers and society would prefer no certi…cation at all, but label-G producers still bene…t from the label-G regime. Then, area 3 corresponds to the area where label-G high-quality producers, other high-quality producers, and the entire industry are better o¤ with a label-G regime, whereas society would be better o¤ with a full-revelation certi…cation. If both certi…cations costs were identical, for low costs, there is underprovision of information. Indeed, high-quality producers are better o¤ with a label-G regime, whereas society would prefer full revelation.
Proof of Propositions 1 and 2
Intermediate values of the full-certi…cation cost corresponds to C 2 ( 2 ; 1 ). Very high values of the label-G costs correspond to C g > g , intermediate values correspond to C g 2 ( 2 ; ' g + n m C); whereas low values correspond to C g < 2 .
For intermediate values of C g , high-quality producers are better (worse) o¤ if C g < 1 ( C g > 1 ) . For low values of C g ; high-quality producers are better (worse) o¤ under the label-G regime only if C g < 1 (C g > 1 ) . For high full-revelation certi…cation cost, i.e., C > 3 , and for intermediate values of the label-G cost, C g 2 [ 3 ; g ], there is over-provision of label-G. Label-G high-quality producers are better o¤ under label-G, whereas society and the entire industry are worse o¤. For intermediate values of label-G costs, i.e., g > C g C, there is underprovision of certi…cation from the society viewpoint.
Club size and equilibrium (Proposition 3) An equilibrium n g 1 exists only if C g > m( h l ). Indeed, the function g (n)
Cg n F (n) is …r s t increasing and then decreasing with n, reaching an optimal value at n and F ( m) = h Cg m . We also need to insure that the function is convex, i.e., F 00 (n) < 0 for n m. This is equivalent to assuming that C g > n 3 d 2 g (n)=dn 2 . The function a (n) is strictly decreasing with a (0) = and a ( m) = l . Thus, either F (n) and a (n) never cross, cross once, or cross twice. If l > g (n) Cg n ; for any n, the two functions never cross, and thus, there is no equilibrium. On the other hand, if h Cg m > , they cross once, but this is in the increasing part of F (n) and this is not an equilibrium either. Indeed, denote n 0 the value of n such that F (n 0 ) = a (n 0 ). If one more producer enters the club, his payo¤ increases to F (n 0 +1), and this is enough to show it is not an equilibrium. If l > h Cg m or equivalently C g > m ( h l ), the two functions cross twice: once in the increasing part of F (n) and another time in its decreasing part at n g . Therefore n g 1 is the equilibrium, as none of the producers have an incentive to deviate from this point.
Label-G choice in the absence of barrier to entry (Propositions 4 and 5) As long as C g > m( h l ), the only equilibrium is a club of size (n 1). However, this size is not chosen, as high-quality producers can get a higher payo¤ if they do not get a label, as > g (n)
Cg n is always satis…ed. Therefore, for C g > m( h ) 1 , there is no club, whereas for C g < 1 , all of the high-quality producers join the club.
The value of C g such that C g = g (C g ) (denoted C g ) is necessarily higher than 1 . Therefore, there exist values of C g , i.e., C g 2 [ 1 ; C g ] for which allowing the club to create a barrier to entry allows for some revelation of information.
Label-G choice in the presence of barrier to entry (Proposition 6) A group of high-quality producers will decide to form a club of size n if it is worthwhile to do so; in other words, as long as C g < g (C g ); where
Cg with g (C g ) = n (C g )( g (C g ) ) and ' g (C g ) = n (C g )( g (C g ) h ). There exists a value of C g , denoted C g , for which C g = g (C g ). There also exists a value of C g for which C g = ' g (C g ) + Cn (C g )= m; that we denote C g (C). As long as C g < C g (C), a club will be formed of size n . For higher values, none of the high-quality producers decide to form a club.
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